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ABSTRACT
In addition to their security properties, adversarial machine-learning attacks and
defenses have political dimensions. They enable or foreclose certain options for
both the subjects of the machine learning systems and for those who deploy them,
creating risks for civil liberties and human rights. In this paper, we draw on in-
sights from science and technology studies, anthropology, and human rights liter-
ature, to inform how defenses against adversarial attacks can be used to suppress
dissent and limit attempts to investigate machine learning systems. To make this
concrete, we use real-world examples of how attacks such as perturbation, model
inversion, or membership inference can be used for socially desirable ends. Al-
though the predictions of this analysis may seem dire, there is hope. Efforts to
address human rights concerns in the commercial spyware industry provide guid-
ance for similar measures to ensure ML systems serve democratic, not authoritar-
ian ends.
1 INTRODUCTION
All technological work has some political dimension. As Langdon Winner illustrated 40 years ago,
a technology’s design, systems, or arrangements can pave the way for certain social or political
relations or foreclose specific possibilities (Winner, 1980). Winner’s most often cited example was
the low bridges that crossed over the parkways that went between New York City and Long Island.
Although it may seem that bridges with low clearance are not political, Winner explains that there
was evidence suggesting that the underpasses were built this way to preclude public buses from
using the roads — denying those who relied on public transit, predominantly low-income New
Yorkers of color, access to certain public spaces (Winner, 1980; Woolgar & Cooper, 1999). Today,
we can speak the politics of algorithms, which can automate decisions in discriminatoryways(Noble,
2018; Eubanks, 2018; Benjamin, 2019) and spyware, which is used and abused by authoritarian
governments to track, suppress, and harm human rights activists and dissidents (Harkin et al., 2019;
Penney et al., 2018). Technology and related work have the potential to reinforce or undermine
existing power relationships in the context in which it is used, and even technologies or related
practices that appear neutral, benign, or even benevolent have potential impacts on civil liberties and
human rights.
In cryptography, significant attention has been devoted to unpacking how particular research direc-
tions within the field may have implications for who deploy cryptographic technologies (Rogaway,
2015). There is also significant work that takes on these questions in the context of data science, Ma-
chine Learning (ML), and algorithmic decision-making more generally (Green, 2019; MacCarthy,
2018). We turn a similar lens on the development of defenses against adversarial attacks on machine
learning, exploring how efforts to secure machine learning systems against attacks can have real-
world harms that disproportionately fall on those who wish to resist the use of such systems. Our
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conclusion at its most basic is that those engaged in security work must understand that securing
machine learning systems has consequences for the human rights and civil liberties of the subjects
of those systemsconsequences that Winner would describe as political.
In this paper, we first discuss how machine learning system deployments increase the chance that
adversarial attacks will be used by the subjects of the systems, who are unlikely to have a full say
in their construction or deployment. Second, we provide real-world examples of how adversarial at-
tacks could be used for desirable aims. Securing systems against attack may inadvertently suppress
dissent or foreclose research that aims to shed light on how ML systems harm particular popula-
tions.We also discuss how the adversarial arms race may lead to the development and deployment
of more invasive forms of surveillance. Finally, we conclude by suggesting directions forward. We
draw an explicit connection to spyware, where activists, researchers, and civil society organizations
have come together to recommend methods to reduce the harm of surveillance technologies.
Throughout this paper, we use facial recognition as the example of machine learning in mass-
surveillance systems. Here, the political risks are clear. Facial recognition technologies (FRT) have
been widely critiqued by scholars and activists (Garvie, 2016; Cyril, 2018), and several municipal-
ities within the United States have banned the use of FRT by local law enforcement (Montgomery,
2019). Most salient to our argument, the harms of FRT usage by authoritarian governments are not
theoretical, and the scope and usages of FRT are expanding rapidly (Mozur, 2019; Balaban, 2015).
2 POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE USAGE OF ML AND THE USE OF
ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
The goals of implementing many machine learning systems can be summarized as doing things
at scale, generally without human intervention. Machine learning systems provide what science
and technology studies author James C. Scott would call legibility (Scott, 1998; Thompson, 1967).
Scott defines legibility as the process by which states took exceptionally complex, illegible, and
local social practices, such as land tenure customs or naming customs, and created a standard grid
whereby it could be centrally recorded and monitored. A machine learning system that aims to tag
an image with the items it contains is a literal example of legibility; it makes readable that which
was previously not visible.
Facial recognition technology makes that which only used to be done by humans (telling if a face
matched) possible by machines. It is the combination of scale and legibility that makes machine
learning systems uniquely attractive to governments and other institutions that seek to maintain
control over large populations (Eubanks, 2018). In the words of Meredith Whittaker, director of
AI Now, facial recognition is usually deployed by those who already have powersay employers,
landlords, and the police — to surveil, control, and in some cases oppress those who don’t. Current
adversarial machine learning scholarship focuses on building robust ML systems and identifying
novel attacks. Attention has not been paid to the people who are subjected to these ML systems.
Subjects may not have the option of opting out or using democratic processes to control the systems,
because of the speed and scale of deployment. (As we were writing this paper, news broke of
ClearviewAI, a company that scrapes publicly available internet images to develop an application
that, at least theoretically, allows for the identification of any person’s face. In order to opt out,
you are required to send them an image of your government identification.) In other cases, people
are completely omitted. For instance, in 2019, DARPA, the research wing of the US Department
of Defense, announced a challenge to build robust ML defenses, saying, We must ensure ML is
safe and incapable of being deceived (Siegelmann, 2019) — but it never explicitly states safe from
whom? And deceived by whom? Although it is common within the security community to view
those who wish to interfere with the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of systems as attackers,
this framing belies the fact that those who resist such systems could just as easily be pro-democracy
protesters or academics interested in evaluating the inclusiveness of training data as they could be
malicious actors.
3 DESIRABLE ATTACKS ON ML
To an ML system, an attacker motivated by a legitimate human rights and civil liberties concern
with the system and an attacker motivated to hide something from the system are the same (Cowen,
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2014; Maly & Horne, 2014) A facial recognition system cannot tell if a person wearing a mask is a
protester or a bank robber. Below, we discuss how three different adversarial attacks could be used
for socially beneficial methods.
• Membership inference can be used to determine whether a given data record was part of
a model’s training set or not. Hardening against membership inference could prevent a
researcher from determining whether a given person was included, which can be useful for
efforts at machine learning accountability or determining the source of images for dataset
training. Fredrikson et al. (2015) use their membership inference techniques to determine
whether a given picture was present in a facial recognition database. Determining whether
a given image is present could help an individual determine whether they are able to bring
a court case against a given facial recognition provider.
• Adversarial examples (Goodfellow et al., 2014) involve modification of a query to get a
desired result. Defenses against perturbation attacks aim at hardening models against com-
mon modifications in order to still allow for image analysis. The EqualAIs project runs
a detection perturbation algorithm for the purpose of allowing individuals to make a cer-
tain image less likely to be detectable as a face (Pedraza et al., 2019) Obfuscation of this
kind could be used by photographers who are documenting protests and would like to post
the images without the potential for facial recognition software to automatically identify
protesters (Schmidt, 2019).
• Hardening against model inversion attacks (Fredrikson et al., 2015) aim to prevent retrieval
of private features. But when blackbox machine learning systems are deployed in contexts
like access to credit, using attacks to retrieve the models may be one of the only ways to
determine whether decisions are being made based on impermissible factors, such as race
or gender.
4 ADVERSARIAL ARMS RACE
It’s not just the preclusion of certain forms of attacks that has implications for the rights and liberties
of people and groups that are subjects of machine learning systems. Efforts to secure ML systems
against attack without proper attention being paid to the uses those systems may in fact lead to more
invasive surveillance measures. Biggio & Roli (2018) remarked that securing ML systems is an
arms race with attackers attempting to break into the system, and the defenders attempting to build
robust defenses. Consider the following not-so-hypothetical scenario:
1. A surveillance state is using facial recognition to quash a peaceful protest. Dissidents try
to escape facial recognition by using masks to occlude their faces.
2. In order to defend against these attackers who are compromising the integrity of the FRT
systems, the state steps up the game with structured occlusion coding for robust face
recognition (Wen et al., 2016); or using pre-trained model of full frontal faces to remove
occlusion(Elmahmudi & Ugail, 2019) In order to defend against this, the dissidents turn to
using adversarial clothing to completely evade the FRT.
3. To gain the upper hand again, the surveillance state uses the newly released adversarial ro-
bustness toolkit from Baidu (Goodman et al., 2020) that can help defend against adversarial
clothing attacks. The dissidents now attempt to escape detection by wearing 3D-printed ad-
versarial eyeglasses (Sharif et al., 2016)
4. To counter this, the surveillance state completely bypasses faces and uses other biometric
technologies, such as iris scanning or gait detection (Hofmann et al., 2011), to identify
people.
This example may seem speculative and far-fetched (protesters wearing adversarial eyeglasses?) but
they illustrate the way in which standard security arms-race thinking can lead to the deployment of
more draconian surveillance measures that suppress dissent.
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5 DIRECTION FORWARD
Adversarial machine learning is not the only security technology with consequences for human
rights. The commercial spyware industry also poses a similar threat, and efforts to address these
risks can provide a useful guidance for those engaged in ML security and the development and
commercialization of adversarial ML toolkits. Spyware researchers have extensively documented
how the multimillion-dollar commercial spyware industry has been used by authoritarian govern-
ments around the world to track, suppress, and censor human rights activists and civil society
groups (Harkin et al., 2019; Penney et al., 2018). In response, a range of civil society, governmen-
tal, and industry actors have developed a range of ethical, corporate social responsibility, and human
rights measures for commercial spyware industry participants (Anstis et al., 2019; Lauterbach, 2017;
Access Now, 2019; Mackune, 2019) including industry standards for transparency, human rights due
diligence, and commitments to h¨uman rights by designp¨rinciples. Similar proposals, using these rec-
ommendations as a foundation, could be offered for the ML industry, particularly those engaged in
securing ML systems and developing and distributing ML toolkits. Vendors and other ML-industry
participants should:
• Commit to the application of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
(UN Guiding Principles) to the industry, and commit to multi-stakeholder efforts to estab-
lish and operationalize their requirements within the industry, particularly on transparency,
human rights due diligence, and remedies.
• Establish and comply with industry-wide standards for transparency and human rights pol-
icy/due diligence measures; blacklisting clients and customers based on human rights con-
siderations (e.g., a governmentwith a poor human rights record); and prohibitions on assist-
ing clients with reconfiguring/hardening ML systems to resist attackers in contexts where
human rights or civil liberties are at risk (e.g., protestors resisting FRT deployed by an
authoritarian government).
• Commit to human rights by design principles, whereby ML systems and toolkits would be
designed to make abusive deployment more difficult. For instance, mandatory features that
report and log ML system uses as well as nature and form of attacks; or automatic tool
disablement on detection of misuse or attempts at reconfiguration.
• Include mandatory provisions in contracts that incorporate UN Guiding Principle require-
ments; make human rights due diligence audits required; outline abusive uses and deploy-
ments that lead to contractual breach, termination, and/or waiver of confidentiality.
None of these ideas is perfect. Indeed, the lesson of attempts to combat authoritarian use of spyware
has been that structured violation of human rights are difficult to overcome through voluntary prac-
tices. Nonetheless, these practices provide a framework for industry participants to deal with ML
adversarial tools and practices.
6 CONCLUSION
Adversarial ML is at a pivotal moment. As these systems become more widely deployed, theoret-
ical attacks and defenses rooted in the academic literature will become the stuff of people’s lives.
We have merely scratched the surface of what a political analysis of adversarial machine learning
attacks and defenses might illuminate. The adversarial ML community has the opportunity to learn
from scholars of science and technology studies, anthropology, and critical race theory — as well
as human rights and ethics literature more generally — and to be in conversation with protesters,
researchers, and others who seek to attack systems for socially beneficial reasons. Through un-
derstanding lived experiences of resistance, applying the lessons of other disciplines, as well as
reflecting upon the work of those seeking to prevent similar outcomes with spyware, the adversarial
ML community can not just understand its work as political but take affirmative steps to ensure that
it is used primarily for good.
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